

Daniel Rhodes Simpson
May 3, 2010



PICTURING DEMOCRACY

*An Empirical Analysis of the Impact on Voter Turnout of the
Photographic Voter Identification Requirement in Georgia*

OVERVIEW

- The rise in the study of election administration following the 2000 Presidential Election and *Bush v. Gore* (2000)
- *Help America Vote Act of 2002*
- Commission on Federal Election Reform

THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM

Report – *Building Confidence in U.S. Elections*

To ensure that persons presenting themselves at the polling place are the ones on the registration list, the Commission recommends that states require voters to use the REAL ID card... The card includes a person's full legal name, date of birth, a signature (captured as a digital image), a photograph, and the person's Social Security number. This card should be modestly adapted for voting purposes to indicate on the front or back whether the individual is a U.S. citizen. States should provide an EAC-template ID with a photo to non-drivers free of charge

HISTORICAL SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE

- Originally left to the states
- 15th Amendment
- 19th Amendment
- 26th Amendment
- *Civil Rights Act of 1964*
- *Voting Rights Act of 1965*

THE GEORGIA REQUIREMENTS

- House Bill 244
- Senate Bill 84
 - Added a provision for individuals to be issued a free photo ID which could be used only for voting.
- *Common Cause v. Billups*

THE INDIANA REQUIREMENTS

- Senate Enrolled Act 483
 - Instead of enumerating certain acceptable forms, it lists requirements for what must be included. Any form which meets the requirements is acceptable.
- *Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, et al*
- *Crawford, et al v. Marion County Election Board*

LITERATURE REVIEW

Riker and Ordeshook (1968)

- Applied economic theory of expected utility to voting processes.

$$R = (BP) - C$$

- R is the reward of voting
- B is the benefit from the success of the preferred candidate
- P is the probability of influencing the outcome
- C is the cost of the act of voting

LITERATURE REVIEW

- von Spakovsky (2006) found no evidence of disparate impact.
- Lott (2006) goes further and asserts that stricter requirements actually increase turnout.
- Vercellotti and Anderson (2006) found a depressed voter turnout especially among African-Americans and Hispanics

LITERATURE REVIEW

- Muhlhausen and Sikich (2007) pointed to methodological issues with the Vercellotti and Anderson study and debunked their findings.
 - Once methodological irregularities were addressed and controls introduced, there was little to no effect, and showed little policy significance.
- Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (2008) also examined the study and found no evidence of decreased participation

LITERATURE REVIEW

- Barreto, Nuño, and Shanchez (2007) found that racial minorities were significantly less likely to meet stringent identification requirements.
- Hood and Bullock (2007) were able to match 93% of registered voters to DMV records.
 - May have other forms of identification
 - Likely not to vote even without ID requirement

LITERATURE REVIEW

- Logan and Darrah (2008) found requirements increased Caucasian turnout, decreased turnout among Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans, and overall was not shown to decrease vote fraud.
- Segal (2008) states that the requirements is a modern day “poll-tax” that forces voters to pay for an acceptable ID.

METHODS

- OLS Linear Regression
- Dependent Variable
 - Indexed voter turnout for an election cycle
 - Presidential Preference Primary, General Primary, General Election
 - Compares the 2004 and 2006 election cycles

METHODS

- Independent Variables
 - Minority rate for 2007
 - Poverty Rate, 2005 Model Based Estimate
 - Elderly Rate, Percentage of population over 65 in 2007
 - Education Rate, percentage of individuals 25+ who have completed bachelor's degree.

RESULTS

Model Summaries of Selected Models

	Model 1 (Original)		Model 6 (Best Fit)	
	A	B	A	B
R	0.336	0.437	0.321	0.408
R ²	0.113	0.191	0.103	0.116
Adj. R ²	0.093	0.171	0.092	0.155
F-Stat	5.627	9.596	9.000	14.749
N	318	293	318	301

RESULTS

Standardized Coefficients across select models (β)				
	Model 1 (Original)		Model 6 (Best-Fit)	
	A	B	A	B
Constant	0.232 (4.329)***	0.233 (4.364)***	0.232 (4.327)***	0.233 (4.385)***
ID Type	0.121 (1.422)	0.288 (3.273)***	0.139 (1.987)*	0.213 (3.048)**
Minority	-0.182 (2.099)*	-0.319 (3.333)***	-0.143 (1.951)	-0.187 (2.477)*
Poverty	0.199 (3.278)***	0.288 (4.640)***	0.230 (3.985)***	0.341 (5.748)***
Elderly	-0.019 (0.242)	-0.091 (1.081)	0.232 (4.327)***	0.233 (4.385)***
Education	-0.077 (0.964)	-0.143 (1.765)		
Density	0.098 (1.497)	0.061 (0.947)		
Homebound	0.232 (4.329)***	0.233 (4.364)***		

* $\leq .05$; ** $\leq .01$; *** $\leq .001$

RESULTS

VIF Scores of the Various Models						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
ID Type	1.000	1.003	1.000	1.003	1.000	1.002
Minority	2.548	2.721	2.525	2.488	2.107	2.313
Poverty	2.615	3.224	2.362	2.434	2.609	3.285
Elderly	1.288	1.356	1.279	1.351	1.258	1.364
Education	2.231	2.515			2.231	2.577
Density	2.240	2.320	1.588	1.583	2.108	2.364
Homebound	1.503	1.469	1.503	1.471		
	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
ID Type	1.000	1.004	1.000	1.002	1.000	1.002
Minority	2.445	2.642	2.083	2.054	1.700	1.740
Poverty	2.534	3.055	2.356	2.453	1.884	2.023
Elderly	1.242	1.311	1.249	1.342	1.164	1.252
Education	1.582	1.835				
Density			1.527	1.553		
Homebound	1.463	1.501				

RESULTS

Zero Order Partial Correlations

	Turnout	ID	Minority	Poverty	Elderly	Education	Density	Homebound
Turnout	1.000	0.232	0.057	0.015	0.190	-0.057	-0.068	0.109
ID	0.232	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Minority	0.057	0.000	1.000	0.619	0.032	-0.027	0.149	0.539
Poverty	0.015	0.000	0.619	1.000	0.314	-0.497	-0.320	0.254
Elderly	0.190	0.000	0.032	0.314	1.000	-0.380	-0.393	0.061
Education	-0.057	0.000	-0.027	-0.497	-0.380	1.000	0.689	0.100
Density	-0.068	0.000	0.149	-0.320	-0.393	0.689	1.000	0.246
Homebound	0.109	0.000	0.539	0.254	0.061	0.100	0.246	1.000

RESULTS

White's Tests for the Models						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
R ²	0.113	0.191	0.113	0.174	0.106	0.176
n	318	293	318	298	318	295
White	35.934	55.963	35.934	51.852	33.708	51.92
χ^2	277.686	254.351	277.686	259.013	277.686	256.216
	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
R ²	0.11	0.175	0.106	0.169	0.103	0.116
n	318	298	318	301	318	301
White	34.98	52.15	33.708	50.869	32.754	34.916
χ^2	277.686	259.013	277.686	261.811	277.686	261.811

LIMITATIONS

- Only one election cycle under new requirements
- Higher motivation because of the candidacy of Obama
- Low R^2 value

CONCLUSIONS

- Turnout actually increased
- Absentee Ballots
- This analysis could find no disparate impact at the county level.
- Looking to the future:
 - Further challenges have been rejected
 - Currently similar legislation pending in the Missouri General Assembly

QUESTIONS

